INVESTIGATION

Our case against BAE Systems and the UK Ministry of Defence possesses a significant and powerful international dimension. An examination of public records reveals a pattern of conduct that extends far beyond the UK, implicating foreign governments as counterparties to tainted contracts, and harming foreign companies who were unlawfully excluded from competition. This global context is crucial for demonstrating a systemic pattern of behaviour and for broadening the scope of our campaigns.

Several foreign governments have been directly involved as the recipients of major defence contracts from BAES that were procured through methods later found to be unlawful or corrupt. The most prominent of these is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through the Al-Yamamah arms deal. This multi-billion-pound arrangement for Tornado and Hawk jets was the subject of a Serious Fraud Office investigation which was ultimately dropped under political pressure, but a subsequent US Department of Justice investigation resulted in BAES pleading guilty to charges related to false accounting and misleading statements in connection with the deal. The history of this contract is replete with credible allegations of enormous slush funds and illicit payments to Saudi officials to secure and maintain the agreement.

Other nations are also directly implicated. BAES admitted to false accounting in the UK related to the 1999 sale of a military radar system to the government of Tanzania, a deal that was demonstrably overpriced and unsuitable for the country’s needs. Furthermore, as part of its 2010 settlement with the US government, BAES effectively admitted that millions of pounds in payments were made to an intermediary with the high probability that they would be used to improperly influence the tender processes in the Czech Republic and Hungary for the lease of Gripen fighter jets. These cases directly involve the governments of Tanzania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as counterparties in procurements tainted by illegality. Investigations into the South African arms deal of the late 1990s have also revealed substantial payments by BAES to advisory companies, alleged to be conduits for bribes to secure contracts for Hawk and Gripen aircraft.

The international dimension also includes a large number of foreign companies who have been directly affected. The most obvious are the major US and European defence contractors who were unlawfully disadvantaged. American firms like Lockheed Martin and Boeing were direct competitors for the fighter jet contracts in the Czech Republic and Hungary, with reports that they withdrew from one tender because the conditions made it impossible to compete. Similarly, European firms such as Dassault of France and other members of the Eurofighter consortium are direct competitors to BAES in global markets. The use of illicit payments to win these contracts directly harmed these companies by depriving them of a fair opportunity to compete.

Furthermore, we must consider foreign companies who were collaborators or co-participants in the tortious conduct, whether wittingly or unwittingly. In the Gripen fighter programme, the primary manufacturer is Saab of Sweden, with BAES acting as a key partner responsible for marketing and securing export orders. The corrupt methods used by BAES to secure sales in Central Europe would therefore have directly involved its Swedish partner. Identifying and engaging with these foreign governments and companies is a vital next step. Their testimony and participation can corroborate our claims, provide evidence of a global pattern of anti-competitive behaviour, and open up the possibility of legal actions in other jurisdictions, dramatically increasing the pressure on BAES and the MOD.

FOIS

My analysis of the case files began with a targeted extraction of the hard facts that anchor our entire strategy, moving our claims from the general to the specific. From the core documents on the BAE Systems and Ministry of Defence relationship, I focused on identifying the precise, long-term, and exclusive procurement agreements. I extracted the names of the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) for complex warships, the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP), and the Munitions Acquisition, the Supply Solution (MASS) agreement because these are the very architecture of the monopoly we seek to challenge. Naming these multi-billion-pound programmes transforms a broad grievance into a set of specific legal targets, which is essential for filing a coherent legal case and for defining the exact scope of any potential mediation. From these same documents, I deliberately extracted the findings of official bodies like the National Audit Office and the Competition and Markets Authority. Their conclusions—that competition is the best driver of value and that the MOD’s own policies have undermined this—are invaluable for our media campaign, as they lend impartial, third-party credibility to our arguments.

To add a layer of narrative power, I turned to the document detailing BAES’s past conduct. From this, I extracted the specific details of the 2010 guilty pleas for corruption and making false statements to the US and UK governments. The reason for this extraction was strategic: it serves to dismantle the “trusted partner” narrative that the MOD relies on to justify its exclusive relationship with BAES. In our media campaign, this history raises profound questions about governmental due diligence. In a legal or mediation setting, it establishes a pattern of corporate behaviour and undermines any defence BAES might mount based on good faith or inadvertent non-compliance.

With the factual and historical basis established, I drew from the more academic and theoretical documents to give our case legal and economic structure. From the paper on market definition, I did not extract facts, but rather the core competition law methodology. This is crucial because to prove that BAES has abused a dominant position, we must first define the market in which it is dominant. These principles allow us to argue authoritatively that, for example, “the market for UK nuclear submarine construction” is a distinct relevant market where BAES holds a monopoly. From the papers on competition policy and duopoly, I extracted the economic theories that explain how dominant firms use exclusionary strategies, such as leveraging exclusive contracts, to maintain their position. This theoretical framework is vital for explaining in a legal filing or mediation why the MOD-BAES agreements are not benign procurement choices, but are textbook examples of anti-competitive market foreclosure.

Finally, I synthesised all of this through the lens of your own “World Public Interest” (WPI) documents. From these files, I extracted the core philosophy and strategic goals of our own organisation. The purpose of this was to ensure that the evidence gathered was not just legally relevant, but was also perfectly aligned with our mission. By understanding that our aim is to challenge anti-competitive structures and vindicate the public interest, I could prioritise the facts and arguments that best highlight the systemic failures and the harm to taxpayers. This ensures that our legal case, our media campaign, and our negotiating position in any mediation all speak with one powerful, unified, and mission-driven voice.

Causes of Action Against the Public Sector (Ministry of Defence)

In Tort Law:

• Misfeasance in Public Office: This is arguably the most potent tort claim available against the MOD. ¹¹¹ It would allege that public officials within the MOD acted unlawfully by systematically favouring a single supplier and disregarding procurement principles designed to ensure competition and value for money. ²² The key elements are proving that the officials knew they were acting beyond their powers and knew their actions would likely cause financial harm to competitors and taxpayers. ³ The persistent awarding of non-competitive, single-source contracts like the TOBA and SEPP, despite stated policy to the contrary, provides strong evidence for this claim. ⁴
• Breach of Statutory Duty: The MOD is subject to legal duties under public procurement regulations, such as the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011. ⁵⁵ These regulations impose duties of fairness, transparency, and non-discrimination. A claim could be brought arguing that the MOD breached these statutory duties by creating a procurement environment that systemically excludes competition. ⁶⁶ The success of such a claim depends on proving that the regulations were intended to confer a right to civil action on those harmed by a breach. ⁷
• Negligence: A claim in negligence is possible but faces higher legal hurdles. ⁸ It would require establishing that the MOD owed a specific duty of care to the claimants (e.g., competitors or taxpayers) to prevent pure economic loss, a duty which courts are generally reluctant to impose on public bodies for policy or procurement decisions. ⁹

In Contract & Public Law:

• Unlawful Contract Award (Ultra Vires): This public law action would challenge the legality of the contracts themselves. The claim would be that the MOD, in awarding multi-decade, exclusive contracts to BAES without fair competition, acted so irrationally and for an improper purpose (i.e., protecting a favoured supplier rather than securing public value) that it exceeded its legal powers. ¹⁰ A successful judicial review could lead to the contracts being declared unlawful and voidable. ¹¹ This is directly evidenced by agreements like the TOBA, which grants BAES the exclusive right to contract for complex warships. ¹²
• Void Contracts due to Breach of Competition Law: The core contracts between the MOD and BAES could be argued to be void as a matter of law. Under Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998, agreements that have the object or effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition are automatically void. ¹³ We would argue that the long-term, exclusive nature of the TOBA, SEPP, and MASS agreements has precisely this effect, rendering them unenforceable. ¹⁴

Joint Responsibility of Private Companies (BAE Systems)

BAES could be held jointly responsible with the MOD for the harm caused, primarily through two legal avenues in tort:

• Unlawful Means Conspiracy: This tort requires an agreement between two or more parties to injure a claimant using unlawful means. We would allege a conspiracy between officials at the MOD and personnel at BAES. The “unlawful means” would be the MOD’s breach of its statutory duties under public procurement law. ¹⁵¹⁵¹⁵ The “agreement” would be the long-standing, symbiotic relationship to maintain a non-competitive market structure. The “intent to injure” would be directed at commercial rivals who were foreclosed from the market. ¹⁶
• Accessory Liability: BAES could be held liable as an accessory to the MOD’s tortious conduct (e.g., misfeasance in public office). This would require showing that BAES knew the essential facts of the MOD’s unlawful conduct and knowingly and actively participated in it for its own benefit. ¹⁷ Given BAES’s deep integration with the MOD and its role as the primary beneficiary of the non-competitive policies, this is a plausible line of argument. BAES’s own history of fines and guilty pleas for corruption and making false statements to governments could be used to demonstrate its capacity and willingness to participate in such schemes. ¹⁸

Based on our comprehensive findings, there is a distinct and significant possibility that many of the contracts central to this case are unlawful and therefore invalid or voidable. The grounds for such a challenge are robust and arise from several overlapping areas of law, primarily competition law and public law, with the historical context of our case adding further weight to claims of illegality.

The most direct ground for invalidity stems from UK competition law. Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 explicitly prohibits agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the UK. Any agreement that infringes this prohibition is automatically void and unenforceable. The long-term, exclusive procurement frameworks between the Ministry of Defence and BAE Systems, such as the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) for warships and the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP), appear to be prime candidates for such a challenge. We can argue persuasively that the very purpose and undeniable effect of these agreements is to foreclose the market to any competitor for decades, thereby preventing, restricting, and distorting competition on a massive scale. If a court or tribunal agrees, the core contracts that underpin BAES’s monopoly position would be legally void.

Secondly, from a public law perspective, the contracts entered into by the Ministry of Defence may be unlawful on the grounds of being ultra vires, meaning the MOD acted beyond its legal powers. A public authority has a duty to act rationally and for proper purposes, which includes a fiduciary-like duty to the public to secure value for money. We can argue that the MOD’s decision to lock the UK into multi-decade, non-competitive contracts with a single supplier, in full knowledge that this strategy stifles innovation and harms the wider industrial base, is so irrational and contrary to the public interest that it constitutes an improper exercise of its statutory powers. Such a finding in a judicial review could lead to a declaration that the resulting contracts are unlawful. This is reinforced by the tort of misfeasance in public office; if an official knowingly acts unlawfully in awarding a contract, the legitimacy of that contract is fundamentally undermined.

A third ground lies in the common law principle that contracts tainted by illegality are unenforceable as a matter of public policy. This is particularly relevant given the history of BAE Systems, which has previously pleaded guilty and paid enormous fines for corrupt practices and bribery used to secure foreign contracts. While this relates to past conduct, it establishes a clear pattern. Should any evidence emerge that similar unlawful methods were used to influence the award or maintenance of any current contract, whether in the UK or with foreign governments, that contract would be at high risk of being declared unenforceable by the courts on the grounds that it was procured through criminality.

These grounds for invalidity are not merely theoretical. They provide a powerful legal lever. Beyond seeking damages for past harm, a successful challenge to the lawfulness of these core contracts could dismantle the very architecture of the monopoly, forcing the market open to the competition that both UK law and public policy demand.

Of course. To ensure our strategy is transparent and that you have full confidence in our approach, I will detail what I extracted from each of the files you provided and explain why those specific extractions are critical to the success of our case, our media campaign, and our mediation projects.

From the core document concerning the Ministry of Defence and BAE Systems’ undertakings, I extracted the specific names of the non-competitive procurement frameworks and the products they cover. This includes the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) for complex warships like the Type 26 frigate, the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP) for nuclear submarines, and the MASS agreement for munitions. I extracted these details because they are the bedrock of our legal case. They allow us to move beyond a general accusation of anti-competitive behaviour and instead target specific, tangible agreements that have demonstrably and unlawfully foreclosed the market. For our media campaign, naming these multi-billion-pound programmes makes the issue concrete for the public, while in a mediation context, it defines the precise subject of the dispute. From this same file, I also extracted the critical conclusion from the Competition and Markets Authority’s 2016 review: that the MOD’s own policy choices were the primary factor undermining competition. This is crucial because it directly implicates the MOD as a facilitator of the anti-competitive environment, strengthening our public law claims against them.

From the document detailing BAES’s past conduct, I extracted the specifics of its 2010 guilty pleas in the US and UK for corruption, bribery, and making false statements to government agencies. I extracted this information to establish a pattern of corporate behaviour. This evidence is vital for our media campaign, as it powerfully undermines any narrative of BAES being a uniquely “trusted” national champion. In a legal setting, while past conduct isn’t proof of current wrongdoing, it can be used to challenge any claims of good faith and demonstrates the company’s historic willingness to subvert legal and regulatory regimes to its own advantage.

From the more academic documents, such as the paper on market definition and market shares, I extracted the core economic and legal principles of how a “relevant market” is defined. I did this not for direct quotation, but to ensure our legal arguments are structured correctly. It allows us to confidently assert that, for example, the market for “complex warship construction” is a distinct market from “non-complex naval vessels.” This technical precision is non-negotiable for the case to succeed before a body like the Competition Appeal Tribunal, as proving dominance requires first defining the market in which that dominance exists.

Similarly, from the competition law papers by authors like Massimo Motta and the analysis of the Mediaset duopoly, I extracted the theoretical frameworks explaining how dominant firms behave to exclude rivals and the economic consequences of monopoly or tight duopoly structures. This theoretical underpinning allows us to interpret the actions of BAES and the MOD not as isolated decisions, but as a classic, textbook example of creating barriers to entry and foreclosing a market. It provides the intellectual backbone for our arguments, helping us explain in mediation or in legal submissions why these long-term exclusive agreements are inherently harmful to competition.

Finally, from the suite of documents outlining the World Public Interest (WPI) grounds, goals, and examples, I extracted the core mission and philosophy of our own organisation. I did this to ensure that every piece of evidence I extracted and every strategic recommendation I made was perfectly aligned with your objectives. Understanding that our goal is not just to win a single case, but to challenge anti-competitive structures and vindicate the public interest, informed my decision to focus on evidence that highlights systemic failures and taxpayer harm. This ensures that the evidence serves not only our legal case, but also the broader aims of our media campaign and our mission to promote a fairer, more competitive economy.

To refine our search for affected competitors and consumer classes, it is essential to move beyond a general understanding and delve into the specific products and services that are the subject matter of the anti-competitive conduct. A detailed examination of the available documents reveals several distinct, high-value product markets where BAE Systems’ dominance, facilitated by the Ministry of Defence’s procurement strategy, is most pronounced. Defining these markets with precision is the cornerstone of our legal case, as it allows us to demonstrate market foreclosure and quantify the resulting harm.

The first and perhaps most critical area is the market for complex maritime vessels. This is not a single market, but is divisible into at least two sub-markets: complex warships and nuclear submarines. For complex warships, the primary product is the Type 26 frigate, which BAES is contracted to produce exclusively under the 15-year Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA). The documents also mention the Type 31 general purpose frigate, for which there was a theoretical possibility of competition that did not meaningfully materialise in a way that challenged BAES’s overall position. In the submarine sector, the key products are the nuclear-powered submarines constructed under the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP). This is a non-competitive arrangement between the MOD and a small enterprise of Tier 1 companies, with BAES at its core. By identifying these specific platforms, we can now search for global competitors who manufacture frigates or nuclear submarines, or, more importantly, the myriad companies that supply the critical subsystems—such as propulsion, sonar, radar, and combat management systems—who have been denied the opportunity to sell to any prime contractor other than BAES.

The second key area is combat air. While the MOD currently procures the F-35 aircraft from the US firm Lockheed Martin, BAES is a major subcontractor, manufacturing a significant portion of each airframe. The true subject of our action here is not just current manufacturing, but the future of UK combat air capability and the lucrative through-life support market. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the support contracts for existing aircraft are the key prizes. The MOD’s historical tendency to award support contracts to the original manufacturer, combined with the lack of alternative UK prime contractors, creates a market where BAES is positioned to dominate for decades to come. Our search for competitors should therefore include firms specialising in military aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), as well as those developing next-generation unmanned and autonomous aerial systems who may be shut out of the FCAS programme.

The third distinct market is munitions. The evidence points to a 15-year, single-source partnering agreement known as the Munitions Acquisition, the Supply Solution (MASS), which has since been replaced by the Next Generation Munitions Solution (NGMS). This arrangement effectively grants BAES a monopoly over the supply of around half of the MOD’s general munitions portfolio. The documents explicitly state that BAES has the only UK facilities capable of producing certain required products, a situation created, at least in part, by the MOD’s long-term single-sourcing approach. This allows us to identify two classes of affected parties: international munitions manufacturers who could have supplied these products, potentially at a lower cost, and UK engineering firms who could have developed their own competing facilities had the market not been foreclosed.

By defining the subject matter with this level of granularity—focusing on specific platforms like the Type 26 frigate, programmes like FCAS, and exclusive agreements like NGMS—we move our case from the abstract to the concrete. Each of these constitutes a relevant market for competition analysis. We can now identify specific competitors who were harmed and more accurately model the financial loss to the ultimate consumer, the UK taxpayer, who has been deprived of the innovation and value for money that only genuine competition can provide.

Based on a detailed analysis of the uncovered causes of action, specifically BAE Systems’ (BAES) abuse of a dominant position and the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) distortive procurement policies, we can identify several industries that have likely been affected. The harm extends beyond direct competitors into adjacent sectors and the wider economy. Below is an assessment of these industries, the nature of the harm they have suffered, and their potential as allies in our legal and media efforts.

1. Directly Foreclosed Competitors: High-Technology Prime Contractors

• Industries and Codes: This group includes major domestic and international firms in the core sectors dominated by BAES, including the manufacture of air and spacecraft (SIC 3030), building of ships and floating structures (SIC 3011), and manufacture of weapons and ammunition (SIC 2540). These fall under the Aerospace & Defense supersector (ICB 5020). Potential claimants identified include Thales Group, Leonardo S.p.A., General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin.

• Nature of Harm (Direct Losses): These firms have suffered direct financial losses from being unlawfully foreclosed from competing for major UK defence contracts¹¹¹. This is due to the MOD’s increasing reliance on non-competitive procurement and long-term, exclusive frameworks with BAES, such as the TOBA for warships and the SEPP for submarines². The very purpose of the original 1999 undertakings was to ensure other prime contractors could compete ³, but the CMA’s 2016 review found they had not resulted in the award of any contract to an alternative prime contractor

• Probability of Success (Legal Claim/Mediation): High. As direct victims of anti-competitive conduct, these firms have a strong basis for a standalone damages claim before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)⁵. The legal claim would be founded on a proven infringement of the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98)⁶. While quantifying the loss of opportunity is complex, it is a recognised head of damages in competition law

• Likelihood of Joining Media Campaign: High. These firms have a clear commercial incentive to support a campaign that could open up the lucrative UK defence market. Their narrative as capable, innovative companies being shut out by a protected national champion is compelling and would add significant weight and credibility to our public messaging.

2. Indirectly Harmed Competitors: Specialist Subcontractors and SMEs

• Industries and Codes: This is a broad category including firms in specialised engineering (SIC 71.12), manufacture of electronic components (SIC 26.1), software development (SIC 62.01), and advanced materials manufacturing. These firms often act as subcontractors.

• Nature of Harm (Indirect Losses & Spillovers): These SMEs and specialised firms are harmed not by being unable to act as prime contractors, but by the lack of a competitive prime market. With BAES as the single gatekeeper, their opportunities are limited to what BAES chooses to subcontract. This creates dependency, suppresses margins, and stifles innovation, as there is no competitive pressure among prime contractors to seek out the best or most cost-effective subcontractors. This contradicts the government’s stated policy objective of achieving “far more involvement from SMEs”⁸.

• Probability of Success (Legal Claim/Mediation): Low to Medium. Their legal path is more challenging. It is difficult to prove a direct loss caused specifically by BAES’s abuse, as opposed to BAES’s commercial subcontracting decisions⁹⁹⁹⁹. However, a collective action could potentially be framed on behalf of a class of subcontractors, arguing that the overall market structure unlawfully suppressed their opportunities and profitability. The evidentiary hurdles would be significant¹⁰.

• Likelihood of Joining Media Campaign: Very High. This group is arguably our most powerful potential ally in the court of public opinion. The story of small, innovative British businesses being held back by a giant incumbent is politically potent. Their participation would directly support the narrative that the current system is detrimental to the UK’s wider industrial base and technological growth.

3. Affected Service Industries: IT, Consultancy, and Logistics

• Industries and Codes: This includes firms in Information technology consultancy activities (SIC 62.02), other information technology service activities (SIC 62.09), and freight transport and logistics (SIC 49.4).

• Nature of Harm (Negative Spillovers): These industries are affected by the concentration of activity. Major IT and logistics contracts that would otherwise be competed for in the open market are subsumed within BAES’s prime contracts. Independent UK service providers are denied the chance to bid for high-value work, which is either kept in-house by BAES or awarded to its own established partners. When BAES rationalises its UK footprint and closes sites^11111111, it causes a direct loss of business for local and national service firms that supported those operations.

• Probability of Success (Legal Claim/Mediation): Very Low. A direct legal claim for compensation from these firms is highly unlikely to succeed. The causal link between BAES’s abuse of dominance and their specific loss of business is too remote and difficult to prove against the backdrop of myriad other economic factors

• Likelihood of Joining Media Campaign: Medium. While they may not have a legal claim, business leaders in these sectors could be powerful advocates. They can speak to the broader economic harm caused by a lack of competition and the negative impact on the UK’s service economy. Their willingness would depend on their exposure to BAES as a potential client in other areas.

4. The UK Public and Investors

• Parties: This includes the entire class of UK taxpayers and institutional investors.

• Nature of Harm (Indirect Losses): For taxpayers, the harm is the reduced value for money on defence spending, ultimately borne by the public purse¹³. For investors (in other UK firms), the harm is the suppressed growth potential of companies in their portfolios that have been denied market access. For investors in BAES itself, there is a risk of loss should the company face massive fines or damages as a result of its conduct, especially given its history of fines for misconduct^14141414.

• Probability of Success (Legal Claim/Mediation): Medium. For taxpayers, the only viable route is an opt-out collective action before the CAT^15151515. While challenging, this mechanism is specifically designed for such diffuse harm¹⁶. The primary hurdles are proving causation and quantifying the aggregate loss¹⁷. For investors, a claim would be based on being misled about the company’s risk profile, which is difficult but possible.

• Likelihood of Joining Media Campaign: High. Taxpayer and consumer advocacy groups are natural allies. The narrative of public funds being wasted and competition being thwarted for the benefit of one company is the core of a successful public interest campaign. Influential institutional investors could also be persuaded to lend their voice, framing this as an issue of poor corporate governance and systemic market risk.

CASELEX

INDUSTRY CODES

Following our strategic identification of potential claimants and collaborators, the next operational phase is to initiate contact to build a powerful coalition. This requires a carefully targeted outreach program directed at the appropriate corporate affairs, legal, and public relations departments of the identified entities, as well as the leadership of relevant industry trade bodies. Our initial investigations have yielded several key points of contact to begin this process.

For the major corporate competitors who form a primary class of claimants, our initial outreach will be directed to their UK and European headquarters. For Thales Group, which has a significant UK presence, we can begin dialogue through their publicly listed media and support channels, such as their technical support email, technical.support@thalesgroup.com, and the media relations contact at their US subsidiary, paul.mehney@thalesdsi.com, to ensure our correspondence is routed to the correct UK corporate affairs entity. For Leonardo S.p.A.’s UK operations, their press office can be contacted directly at leonardopressoffice@leonardo.com, and for investor-related matters which may touch upon corporate risk and governance, their investor relations department is available at ir@leonardo.com.

With regard to the major US defence contractors, we will approach their UK-based entities. General Dynamics UK can be reached via their general enquiries email, enquiries@generaldynamics.uk.com. For Lockheed Martin UK, we have identified a direct corporate communications contact, Andrew Boyle, at andrew.1.boyle@global.lmco.com.

For the UK-based entities existing in a complex ecosystem with BAES, we can direct our initial correspondence to the publicly listed contacts for their corporate and investor relations departments. Babcock International Group’s Director of Communications is Kate Hill, who can be reached at +44 (0)20 7355 5312, and their Director of Investor Relations is Andrew Gollan. For Rolls-Royce Holdings plc, their UK Government Relations department can be contacted at government.relations@rolls-royce.com, and investor relations queries can be sent to Investor.Relations@Rolls-Royce.com.

To engage with the broad and diverse class of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) claimants in the supply chain, a direct approach to each is impractical. A more effective strategy is to engage with the primary trade bodies that represent their interests. For the aerospace, defence, security, and space sectors, ADS Group Ltd is the premier trade organisation. Their membership team can be reached at membership@adsgroup.org.uk. For companies specifically in the defence manufacturing supply chain, Make UK Defence is a key representative body, and they can be contacted at their dedicated email address, defence@makeuk.org. In the maritime sector, the Society of Maritime Industries is the leading voice, and their general contact is info@maritimeindustries.org. By presenting our case to these organisations, we can reach a wide audience of potential class members who may have suffered from anti-competitive practices.

This initial phase of outreach will be conducted with the utmost professionalism and discretion, outlining the nature of our investigation into the UK defence market and inviting these entities to a confidential discussion about their experiences. The goal is to build a robust and unified front to challenge the systemic market distortion and seek redress for all harmed parties.

Upon re-examining the complete dossier, it is clear that the case against BAE Systems (BAES) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not merely a matter of legal theory but is substantiated by a powerful and interconnected body of evidence contained within the documents. Extracting and synthesising these key facts will be critical to fortifying our legal challenges, transforming broad allegations into specific, evidenced claims.

Our central assertion is that BAES has abused its dominant position, a position actively and unlawfully curated by the MOD. The evidence for BAES’s dominance is overwhelming. It is the UK’s largest defence supplier, receiving £3.7 billion from the MOD in 2015/16 alone, which was more than double the amount paid to the next largest supplier¹. This dominance is cemented by a series of long-term, non-competitive procurement frameworks, such as the 15-year Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) which grants BAES the exclusive right to build complex warships ², the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP) for nuclear submarines ³³³³, and the Munitions Acquisition, the Supply Solution (MASS) agreement⁴⁴⁴⁴. These agreements, presented by the MOD as necessary to maintain sovereign capability, have effectively eliminated competition, a fact the CMA itself noted in its 2016 review^555555555. The MOD’s own policy is to use competition wherever possible ⁶, yet its reliance on single-source contracts with BAES has demonstrably increased, creating a market structure where BAES faces no credible rivals for major projects⁷⁷⁷⁷.

The abuse of this dominance is subtle but profound. It is not necessarily found in pricing that violates the SSRO framework, but in a course of conduct designed to perpetuate its monopoly. The 2016 CMA review is a critical piece of evidence here. While it concluded that MOD policy was the primary reason the 1999 undertakings were ineffective, it also found no evidence that the undertakings had ever resulted in a contract being awarded to an alternative prime contractor that needed access to BAES’s resources⁸. This demonstrates that the competitive remedy was inert. The real abuse is how BAES, in concert with the MOD, has created a situation where the “sovereign capability” argument becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. BAES has rationalised its UK footprint, closing facilities in combat vehicles and munitions⁹⁹⁹⁹, while the MOD’s procurement strategy ensures no other UK firm can develop the capacity to compete.

This leads directly to the case against the MOD for misfeasance in public office and its role as a co-conspirator. The MOD has repeatedly failed in its duty to secure value for money for the taxpayer, a core theme of the National Audit Office report¹⁰. The NAO report highlights that the most effective route to Value for Money is normally through competition, which is frequently absent in major defence contracts¹¹. The MOD’s justification for this, such as needing a “trusted national supplier,” is severely undermined by the evidence of BAES’s past corporate misconduct. Our evidence file shows that in 2010, BAES pleaded guilty and paid a $400 million fine for conspiring to make false statements to the U.S. government regarding its anti-corruption compliance and for violating export controls^12121212. It admitted to creating offshore shell companies to conceal payments to advisors, knowing there was a high probability the funds would be used for bribes to secure contracts^13131313. For the MOD to simultaneously claim BAES is a uniquely “trusted” partner while being aware of this history of systemic deception suggests a reckless disregard for its public duty.

The harm to our potential claimant classes is directly quantifiable from this conduct. For competitors, the harm is total market foreclosure in key sectors. For taxpayers, the harm is the systematic overpayment for defence equipment. The MOD’s projected £1.7 billion in savings from the SSRO regulations is, as our initial analysis noted, an implicit admission of the scale of overpayment in the non-competitive environment it fosters^14141414. The NAO itself questioned whether these savings were truly being realised, noting that by July 2017, only a fraction of this had been achieved through reductions in contract prices^15151515.

Finally, the MOD’s own procedural documents, such as the FOIA guidelines, reveal the likely defences we will face. The MOD will almost certainly seek to withhold crucial information under the absolute exemption for security matters or the qualified exemptions for national security and defence¹⁶. However, our case is not about revealing state secrets; it is about challenging the legality and rationality of a procurement process that has wasted billions in public funds and destroyed a competitive market. We will argue that the public interest in transparency and accountability for this economic harm outweighs the generalised claims of protecting national security, especially when the actions themselves have demonstrably failed to deliver value for money. The evidence, taken as a whole, paints a damning picture of market capture and regulatory failure, providing a robust foundation for the legal actions we intend to pursue.