FOIA
To build evidence for Coco’s case, we need specific, disclosable information from public authorities like the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO). FOIA requests must be precise, avoid exempt categories (e.g., national security, commercial confidentiality under Section 43), and focus on public interest data. Below are tailored requests:
**Ministry of Defence (MOD)**
1. **Document**: All correspondence between MOD and BAES regarding the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) and Single Equipment Procurement Plan (SEPP) from 2015–2025, redacted to exclude national security details.
– **Question**: What criteria were used to justify single-source awards to BAES under TOBA and SEPP, and how were these evaluated against competitive tendering requirements?
– **Relevance**: Supports misfeasance and conspiracy claims by showing preferential treatment or lack of value-for-money (VFM) justification, per NAO reports citing £1.7 billion in inflated costs.
2. **Document**: Internal MOD value-for-money assessments for BAES single-source contracts (2015–2025), excluding sensitive operational data.
– **Question**: How did MOD ensure VFM in single-source contracts awarded to BAES, and what alternatives were considered?
– **Relevance**: Bolsters misfeasance claims if VFM assessments are absent or inadequate, undermining public interest obligations.
3. **Document**: Records of meetings between MOD officials and BAES lobbyists (2015–2025), including agendas and minutes, redacted for confidentiality.
– **Question**: What topics were discussed in these meetings, particularly regarding procurement strategy or contract awards?
– **Relevance**: Supports conspiracy claims by evidencing potential undue influence, aligning with lobbying data from ORCL and LobbyFacts.
4. **Document**: MOD’s procurement policy documents (2015–2025) justifying single-source contracts over competitive tenders.
– **Question**: What policy rationale supports MOD’s preference for single-source contracts with BAES, and how is this reconciled with competition law principles?
– **Relevance**: Strengthens Chapter II and misfeasance claims by showing policy-driven market distortion, per CMA’s 2016 review.
**Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)**
1. **Document**: Full text of BAES undertakings from merger control or market investigations (2010–2025), including compliance reports.
– **Question**: What specific obligations did BAES undertake, and how has the CMA monitored compliance?
– **Relevance**: Provides evidence for Chapter II claims if BAES breached undertakings (e.g., technology access denial), per the document’s note on evidentiary weight.
2. **Document**: CMA’s 2016 market study report on the UK defence sector, including unpublished annexes or data.
– **Question**: What findings did the CMA make regarding BAES’s market share and MOD procurement impacts on competition?
– **Relevance**: Supports Chapter II claims by quantifying BAES’s dominance (e.g., >50% market share) and market foreclosure, per document’s analysis.
3. **Document**: Correspondence between CMA and MOD on BAES’s undertakings or competition concerns (2015–2025), redacted for exemptions.
– **Question**: What discussions occurred regarding MOD’s role in undermining BAES undertakings?
– **Relevance**: Bolsters misfeasance and conspiracy claims by showing regulatory awareness of procurement issues.
**Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO)**
1. **Document**: SSRO reports on BAES’s compliance with pricing regulations for single-source contracts (2015–2025).
– **Question**: Were any BAES contract prices deemed non-compliant with “fair and reasonable” standards, and what actions followed?
– **Relevance**: Challenges excessive pricing claims under Chapter II, as SSRO compliance may defend BAES, per document’s hurdle analysis.
2. **Document**: SSRO’s analysis of profit margins on BAES’s single-source contracts (2015–2025).
– **Question**: How do BAES’s profit margins compare to industry benchmarks, and were any flagged as excessive?
– **Relevance**: Supports Chapter II exploitative abuse claims if margins exceed benchmarks, despite SSRO oversight.
**HM Treasury**
1. **Document**: Records of CMA penalty payments from BAES (2010–2025) to the Consolidated Fund.
– **Question**: What penalties has BAES paid to HM Treasury for competition or procurement violations, and how were these calculated?
– **Relevance**: Supports misconduct history for conspiracy claims, per Violation Tracker’s 2010 £30 million fine.
2. **Document**: Treasury reviews of MOD procurement spending efficiency (2015–2025).
– **Question**: What assessments has Treasury made of MOD’s single-source spending with BAES, and what efficiency concerns were raised?
– **Relevance**: Strengthens misfeasance claims by showing fiscal oversight failures, aligning with NAO findings.
**FOIA Limitations Considered**:
– **Section 24 (National Security)**: Requests are worded to exclude sensitive operational or security data, focusing on policy, financial, or compliance records.
– **Section 43 (Commercial Interests)**: Redaction is permitted for confidential commercial data, but public interest in transparency (e.g., taxpayer VFM) outweighs exemptions for non-sensitive contract or policy details, per ICO guidance.
– **Section 12 (Cost Limits)**: Requests are specific to avoid excessive retrieval costs, targeting defined document types and timeframes.
– **Section 44 (Prohibited by Other Legislation)**: No requests infringe statutory bars (e.g., GDPR), and public interest in competition law enforcement supports disclosure.
### Draft Freedom of Information Act Request Letter
Oscar Moya LLedo
[Your Address]
[City, Postal Code]
contact@cocoo.uk
[Date: July 18, 2025]
Freedom of Information Officer
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall, London, SW1A 2HB
foi@mod.gov.uk
Dear Sir/Madam,
Subject: Freedom of Information Request
Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information to be disclosed within the statutory timeframe. If this request does not reach the intended recipient, please forward it internally to the relevant department, as required by EU transparency obligations (e.g., Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001).
1. All correspondence between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and BAE Systems (BAES) regarding the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) and Single Equipment Procurement Plan (SEPP) from January 1, 2015, to July 18, 2025, redacted to exclude national security details. Please provide details on criteria used to justify single-source awards to BAES under these frameworks and how these were evaluated against competitive tendering requirements.
2. Internal MOD value-for-money assessments for single-source contracts awarded to BAES from January 1, 2015, to July 18, 2025, excluding sensitive operational data. Please clarify how MOD ensured value-for-money and what alternative suppliers or methods were considered.
3. Records of meetings between MOD officials and BAES representatives or lobbyists from January 1, 2015, to July 18, 2025, including agendas and minutes, redacted for confidentiality where necessary. Please specify topics discussed, particularly regarding procurement strategy or contract awards.
4. MOD procurement policy documents from January 1, 2015, to July 18, 2025, justifying the preference for single-source contracts over competitive tenders. Please explain the policy rationale and how it aligns with competition law principles.
I understand that exemptions under the FOIA (e.g., Section 24 for national security, Section 43 for commercial interests) may apply, but I request disclosure of non-exempt information in the public interest, particularly concerning taxpayer value and market competition. If any request exceeds cost limits under Section 12, please advise on refining the scope.
Please provide the information in electronic format to contact@cocoo.uk. If clarification is needed, contact me at the same email. I expect a response within 20 working days, as per FOIA requirements.
Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo
—
**Additional Notes**:
– **Why This Letter Targets MOD**: The MOD is central to procurement-related evidence, critical for misfeasance and conspiracy claims. Separate FOIA requests should be sent to CMA, SSRO, and HM Treasury for their respective documents, using similar wording but tailored to their roles.
– **FOIA Compliance**: The letter avoids broad or vague requests, specifies redactions for exemptions, and emphasizes public interest to maximize disclosure likelihood.
– **EU Law Reference**: Mentioning EU transparency obligations ensures compliance with cross-border legal standards, even post-Brexit, as UK public bodies must consider such principles in information sharing.
Let me know if you need additional FOIA letters for other authorities or further refinements to the requests!
Mediation Agreement for BAES Case
This Mediation Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into on [Insert Date] between Coco, a non-profit organization represented by Oscar Moya LLedo, Solicitor, with its principal office at [Insert Address] (“Claimant”), BAE Systems plc, a public limited company registered in England and Wales under CRN 01470151, with its registered office at 6 Carlton Gardens, London, SW1Y 5AD (“BAES”), and the Ministry of Defence, a UK government department, with its principal office at Whitehall, London, SW1A 2HB (“MOD”) (collectively, the “Parties”). The Parties agree to mediate disputes arising from alleged anti-competitive conduct and procurement practices in the UK defence market.
1. Scope of Mediation
The mediation addresses claims that BAES abused its dominant position under Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 through exclusionary practices (e.g., refusing access to essential technology) and that MOD’s non-competitive procurement frameworks (e.g., TOBA, SEPP) caused economic harm to competitors and taxpayers. The mediation seeks to resolve disputes regarding market foreclosure, inflated costs, and related harms, including potential misfeasance in public office and unlawful means conspiracy.
2. Appointment of Mediator
The Parties appoint [Insert Mediator Name], an independent mediator with expertise in competition law and public procurement, to facilitate resolution. The mediator’s contact details are [Insert Contact Info]. The mediator will act neutrally, without authority to impose a binding decision.
3. Mediation Process
The mediation will commence within 30 days of this Agreement’s execution, with sessions conducted in London or virtually, as agreed. Each Party will submit a confidential position statement (maximum 10 pages) to the mediator 7 days prior, outlining claims, defenses, and proposed remedies. The process will include joint sessions and private caucuses, with a target resolution within 60 days, extendable by mutual consent. All communications are confidential and without prejudice, inadmissible in legal proceedings unless agreed otherwise.
4. Proposed Remedies
The Claimant seeks: (a) a compensation fund for affected competitors (e.g., Thales, Leonardo, SMEs) and taxpayers, estimated at £1.7 billion based on NAO reports; (b) MOD procurement reforms, including mandatory competitive tendering for non-critical contracts; (c) BAES’s agreement to license essential technology on fair terms; and (d) an independent monitor to oversee BAES’s compliance. BAES and MOD may propose counter-remedies, such as a phased re-competition framework or a strategic partner agreement guaranteeing BAES key contracts in exchange for market opening.
5. Costs and Fees
Each Party will bear its own legal and administrative costs. Mediator fees will be split equally among the Parties, payable within 14 days of invoicing. Any settlement fund or reform costs will be negotiated during mediation.
6. Confidentiality
All mediation discussions, documents, and offers are confidential, governed by the Data Protection Act 2018 and GDPR. Disclosure is permitted only with mutual consent or as required by law (e.g., CMA investigations).
7. Good Faith Commitment
The Parties agree to participate in good faith, providing relevant documents (e.g., BAES’s contract awards, MOD’s procurement records) as requested by the mediator, subject to national security exemptions. Failure to engage may be noted in any subsequent legal proceedings.
8. Termination
Any Party may withdraw with 7 days’ written notice. The mediation will terminate upon a signed settlement, failure to reach agreement within the agreed timeframe, or mutual consent. Termination does not preclude future mediation or legal action.
9. Governing Law
This Agreement is governed by the laws of England and Wales, with disputes arising hereunder subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts.
Signatures
Coco: _________________________
Oscar Moya LLedo, Solicitor
BAE Systems plc: _________________________
[Authorized Signatory]
Ministry of Defence: _________________________
[Authorized Signatory]
Mediator: _________________________
[Mediator Name]
SELF-QUESTIONS ON PROCUREMENT:
In a court setting, when we ask the Ministry of Defence for the documented analysis that justifies their exclusive deals, we fully expect their response to be a deflection, citing vague principles of national security and sovereign capability rather than providing a concrete value-for-money comparison. The most viable solution is not to hunt for a document that likely does not exist, but to use its absence as proof of their irrational and therefore unlawful decision-making. Our legal argument will be that in the absence of a rational, evidence-based process, the decision was, by definition, an improper exercise of public power.
Similarly, when we ask BAE Systems about the enhanced compliance measures they applied to UK contracts following their 2010 guilty pleas, their answer will invariably be a polished statement about their world-class global ethics program. The most effective counter-solution is to argue that any internal compliance program is rendered meaningless within a closed, non-transparent monopoly. Therefore, the viable solution we would propose in a settlement, or seek as a remedy from the court, is the imposition of an independent, external monitor with forensic auditing powers to oversee their UK public contracts. Our position is that their history of misconduct means they have forfeited the right to be trusted. The evidence from the excluded SMEs will, in contrast, be specific and powerful. The solution here is to aggregate their individual stories of lost opportunity into a comprehensive economic report that quantifies the total financial harm and the “innovation deficit” inflicted on the UK’s industrial base, making our claim for damages concrete and substantial.
In a confidential mediation, the answers to our questions reveal the different but equally potent levers we can pull. When we explore what a successful outcome looks like for taxpayers beyond mere compensation, the most viable solution is to propose a “Public Value Covenant.” This would be a structured settlement that includes a significant compensation fund, a legally binding commitment from the MOD to specific and measurable procurement reforms, and the creation of an independent oversight body to ensure those reforms are implemented. This multi-part solution addresses the desire for both restitution and genuine, lasting change.
When we probe the Ministry of Defence on the non-financial costs of their dependency on a single supplier, we anticipate they would concede concerns over operational risk and a lack of agility. The most viable solution to propose is a “Managed Re-competition Framework.” This would be a confidential, face-saving roadmap that allows the MOD to gradually introduce competition into the supply chain over a period of five to ten years. They could then publicly present this as their own forward-thinking reform to enhance national security, turning our campaign’s criticism into their political victory. For BAE Systems, when we question the long-term commercial risk of their politically contentious monopoly, the most viable solution is to offer them a “Strategic Partner Agreement.” This would be a grand bargain where they trade their unstable exclusive position for a new, publicly endorsed 25-year contract that guarantees them the most critical, high-value work, on the condition that all other contracts and sub-systems are opened to fair and transparent competition. This offers them what all large corporations crave most: long-term stability and predictable revenue, making it a powerful incentive for them to come to the negotiating table.
SELF-QUESTIONS ON COMPENSATION:
In response to our court-focused questions, the answers will likely be evasive, but tellingly so. When we ask the Ministry of Defence for the documented analysis proving their exclusive deals offered superior value for money, we anticipate they will provide no such specific evidence. Their response will likely be couched in broad terms of “national security” and “sovereign capability,” arguing that such decisions are too complex for a simple cost-benefit analysis. The most viable solution for us in court is to use this very lack of specific, rational, evidence-based justification as the core of our argument that the decision to foreclose the market was an unlawful and irrational exercise of public power.
When we ask BAE Systems what enhanced due diligence they applied to their UK contracts after their 2010 guilty pleas for corruption, we expect a polished corporate response about their new, world-class global compliance programs. The most viable solution is not to challenge the existence of these paper policies, but to argue that they are functionally meaningless in a market that lacks the transparency and scrutiny of genuine competition. Our position will be that the exclusive, non-competitive nature of the relationship itself constitutes a structural compliance failure, one that their internal procedures can never remedy. Conversely, when we ask the excluded SMEs for documentation of their capabilities for contracts they were never allowed to bid on, we anticipate receiving a wealth of evidence—business plans, R&D records, and expressions of interest—that will form the heart of our case. The most viable solution is to aggregate this evidence to build an irrefutable picture of a vibrant industrial base that was deliberately stifled, thereby allowing us to quantify the harm and prove our case.
In a mediation context, the answers to our questions reveal the pathways to a comprehensive settlement. When we ask the taxpayer class what success looks like beyond financial compensation, the most viable and sustainable solution will be a combination of a significant restitution fund and a fundamental, legally-binding reform of the procurement process. A purely financial settlement that allows the same conduct to continue is not a true victory.
When we confidentially ask the Ministry of Defence about the non-financial costs of their arrangement, we open the door to a solution that allows them to save face while achieving their strategic aims. Their underlying interest is not just in procuring equipment, but in ensuring national security and operational readiness. We anticipate they would privately concede that dependency on a single supplier creates unacceptable strategic risks. The most viable solution, therefore, is a phased transition to a more competitive model that the MOD can present as a forward-thinking reform that enhances national security by creating a more resilient industrial base.
Finally, when we ask BAE Systems about the long-term commercial risks of their current contentious position, we are appealing to their core business interests. We expect their board would recognise that their UK monopoly is politically unstable and a magnet for legal challenges. The most viable solution for them is to trade this precarious monopoly for long-term stability. A mediated settlement could guarantee their role as a core strategic partner on certain key programmes for decades, in exchange for their agreement to a structured and progressive opening of the wider market. This provides them with a predictable future, free from constant legal and political attack, which is an immensely valuable commercial outcome.
MEDIATION
For the last set of documents you provided, my extraction was highly tactical, focused on gathering the specific tools and language needed to translate our pressure campaign into a successful procurement and mediation outcome. Let me detail what I extracted from each file group and why.
From the documents concerning mediation and alternative dispute resolution, I extracted the underlying principles and procedural frameworks of structured negotiation. My goal was not to become a mediator ourselves, but to strategically leverage the language of dispute resolution for our own purposes. I extracted these concepts to add a powerful new dimension to our Unsolicited Strategic Proposal. By framing our proposed low-value scoping study as a “Dispute Mitigation Analysis” or a “Pre-Mediation Scoping Exercise,” we provide the Ministry of Defence with a compelling justification to engage with us. It allows them to publicly demonstrate that they are taking proactive steps to understand and resolve the very issues our campaign is highlighting, thereby managing their legal and political risk. This extracted knowledge strengthens our proposal by aligning it with established government practices for resolving complex conflicts.
From the model government service contracts and their accompanying guidance notes, I extracted the precise terminology, structure, and standard clauses that UK public bodies use when procuring services. I focused on understanding how they define a “Statement of Work,” how they structure pricing schedules, and what they expect in terms of “Deliverables,” “Key Personnel,” and “Acceptance Criteria.” I extracted this granular detail so that our Unsolicited Proposal would be drafted in a format that is instantly recognisable and professionally aligned with their internal commercial processes. The purpose was to ensure that when we submit our proposal for the low-value scoping study, it does not look like a complaint letter but like a formal, pre-packaged government contract ready for execution. This removes administrative friction and makes it as easy as possible for a public official to justify and process our proposal as a solution to the problem we have created for them.